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Summary  findings
Smarzynska and Wei study the impact of corruption in a  investment and shifts the ownership structure toward
host country on foreign investers' preference for a joint  joint ventures. Conditonal on foreign direct investment
venture or a wholly owned subsidiary.  taking place, an increase in corruption from the level
Their simple model highlights a basic tradeoff in using  found in Hungary to that found in Azerbaijan decreases
local partners. On the one hand, corruption makes the  the probability of a wholly owned subsidiary by 10 to 20
local bureaucracy less transparent and increases the value  percent. Technologically more advanced firms are less
of using a local partner to cut through the bureaucratic  likely to engage in joint ventures, however.
maze.  Smarzynska and Wei find support for the view that
On the other hand, corruption decreases the effective  U.S. firms are more averse to joint ventures in corrupt
protection of an investor's intangible assets and reduces  countries than are other foreign investors - possibly
the probability that disputes between foreign and  because of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which
domestic partners will be adjudicated fairly, which  stipulates penalties for executives of U.S. companies
reduces the value of having a local partner.  whose employees or local partners engage in paying
As the investor's technological sophistication increases,  bribes.
so does the importance of protecting intangible assets,  But although U.S. companies are more likely than
which tilts the preference away from joint ventures in a  investors from other countries to retain full ownership of
corrupt country.  firms in corrupt countries, they are not less likely than
Empirical tests of this hypothesis on firm-level data  firms from other countries to undertake foreign direct
show that corruption  reduces inward foreign direct  investment in those countries.
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The issue of corruption has become a prominent item on the agenda of international
institutions and national governments.' The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International  Business Transactions,  which was signed in 1997 and
went into effect in February 1999, criminalizes  bribery of foreign officials by firms from
member countries. Yet indices produced  by organizations such as Transparency International
suggest that corruption is still a widely spread phenomenon.  While there exists evidence
indicating that corruption has a negative impact on the magnitude of inward foreign direct
investment  inflows (Hines, 1995; and Wei, 2000), little is known about how corruption affects
the composition of these flows, which is the central focus of this paper.
There are two strands of literature related to this paper. The first one is the literature on
foreign direct investment, too vast to be comprehensively  referenced here (see Caves, 1982,
and Froot, 1993, and the citations therein), which encompasses  firm-level studies focusing on
the choice of entry mode (for example,  Kogut and Singh, 1988; Blomstrom and Zejan, 1991;
Asiedu and Esfahani, 1998; and Smarzynska,  2000). None of the studies of the entry mode,
however, examine  the effect of corruption on the decision to have a joint venture partner. The
second literature relevant for this paper analyzes the consequences or causes of corruption in a
cross section of countries, including Mauro (1995), Ades and Ti Della (1999), Kaufmnann  and
Wei (1999) and others. Most of these papers do not deal with foreign direct investment.
Wheeler and Mody (1992), Hines (1995), and Wei (2000) are the only three papers that we
are aware of that examine  the effect of corruption on foreign  direct investment.  None of these
papers employ firm-level data or estimate simultaneously  a foreign investor's decision to
locate in a country and their choice between a joint venture and a sole ownership.
We believe that understanding  the connection  between corruption and FDI ownership
composition is important for several reasons. First, understanding  the determinants of FDI
ownership composition is important  in its own right. For example,  many developing and
transition economies are eager to attract foreign investors for the advanced technologies that
they may bring.  The technological content of a foreign investment  varies with the ownership
composition of the investment. Second, host country corruption ought to play a more
See, for instance, "Transition" 7(9-10), September/October  1996.
1significant  role in theories and empirics of international  capital flows than it does so far.
Cross-country  variation in corruption levels is as large as the variations in labor cost or
corporate tax rate, two commonly emphasized  determinants  of international  direct investment.
Third, given that corruption is elusive to measure but important conceptually,  it is useful to
derive and test more nuanced predictions of the economic  consequences of corruption, such as
its effect on the composition of FDI. This could help increase our confidence that popularly
used measures of corruption are indeed meaningful and informative.
In this paper, we present a sirnple  model describing how a foreign investor's choice of
entry mode may be affected by the extent of corruption  in a host country. Corruption  makes
dealing with government officials, for example, to obtain local licenses and permits, less
transparent and more costly, particularly for foreign investors. In this case, having a local
partner lowers the transaction cost (e.g., the cost of securing local permits). At the same time
sharing ownership may lead to technology leakage. 2 Both costs of local permits and losses
from technology leakage are positively related to the extent of corruption in a host country.
The model predicts that when corruption level is sufficiently  high no investment will take
place. When corruption is low enough so that investment  can take place, the foreign investor
with more sophisticated technology  prefers a wholly-owned form, but, holding the
technological  level constant, the investor is more inclined to have a local partner in a more
corrupt host country.
We test our hypotheses using a unique firm-level data from transition economies 3. We
show that the probability of investment  taking place is negatively  related to the extent of
corruption in a host country. Moreover, foreign investors with more sophisticated
technologies and those operating in corrupt countries are indeed more likely to retain full
ownership of their projects than to engage in JVs.
Hines (1995) suggested that US multinationals  behave differently than investors of
other nationalities,  namely, they tend to avoid  joint ventures in corrupt countries. This
2 Smarzynska (2000) shows empirically  that foreign investors  with more sophisticated technologies  are less
likely to share ownership than investors possessing fewer intangible assets. She attributes this finding to
concerns about knowledge dissipation that would lead to a greater loss in the case of investors with more
sophisticated technologies.
Our data set is unique in the extent of its coverage.  Previous studies on the choice of entry mode use data on
FDI originating in one and less major source country (i.e., Sweden  in the case of Blomstrom and Zejan, 1991) or
FDI entering a single host country (typically the United States as in the case of Kogut and Singh, 1988; Asiedu
2behavior is likely to be a consequence of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977  which
stipulates penalties for executives of American companies  whose employees or local partners
engage in paying bribes. We find support for this view and show that US companies are more
likely than investors from other countries to retain full ownership in corrupt countries, even
though they are not less likely to undertake FDI in corrupt economies than firms from other
source countries. 4
We organize the rest of the paper in the following way. Section FF presents a
minimalist model that highlights the effects of corruption and technological sophistication  on
the ownership structure of foreign investment. Section III discusses  the empirical results.
Section IV concludes.
II. A Minimalist Model
In this section, we present a simple model that will be used to motivate the subsequent
empirical tests on corruption and the FDI entry mode. Let qk  be the corruption level in host
country k defined over the interval [0, 0] and tj the level of technological  sophistication  of
foreign investorj, also defined to be in the interval [0, co].  Note that where no confusion
arises, we will drop the subscripts for simplicity.
The value of setting up a wholly owned firm to the foreign  investor is:
U(wo) =  Vw  -C..(qk)
where C,.(q)  is the cost of securing  the local permits when not having a local partner. 5 We
assume that this cost increases with the corruption level in the country:
C'.  (q) >0
and  C.. (O)  = O
The value of setting up ajoint venture to the foreign  investor is:
U(jv) = Vj - L(tj,q,)  - Cfr(qk)
and Esfahani, 1998).  Our data set covers investment  projects undertaken in twenty-two  economies by investors
from all over the world.
4Note that the latter finding is consistent with the results of Wei (2000) who shows that US investors are no
more averse to entering corrupt countries than OECD investors.
S  We use the label "local permits" to represent a variety of local inputs whose acquisition  costs may rise as the
local bureaucracy  becomes less and less transparent.
3where L(tj, qk)  is the technology leakage function and Cj,(q) is the cost of securing  the local
permits to the foreign investor having a local partner. We assume that leakage is more likely
in countries with a higher level of corruption and the cost of leakage increases  with the
sophistication  of technology owned by the foreign investor. Thus,
L, > O,L  > 0,  Ltq > 0
L(O,q) = 0
We also assume that
Ctjf (q) > 0
c,v (0) = 0
and
C,,, (q) <  C',(q)
The last assumption says that as corruption  rises, the cost of acquiring local permits
increases faster for a foreign investor pursuing a wholly-owned firm than one with a local
joint venture partner.
For simplicity,  we choose specific linear functional  forms for L(t, q),  C,,, 0 (q) and
Cjv  (q), that satisfy the conditions stated above, with an eye on yielding a parsimonious
expression that can be estimated econometrically.
Let C., = cq
C,,,,  = (c +  O)q
L(t, q) = A  + 4tq
where c, 0, y and + are positive constants. With these assumptions, the value of a wholly-
owned investment project equals
U(wo) = V,,, 0 - (c + 9)q
And the value of a joint venture is
U(jv)  = Vfr  - y - -tq  - cq
We will assume that Vw 0 2 VJV,  as it seems plausible. However, our key conclusion regarding
the effect of corruption on the composition of FDI does not depend on this assumption.
4The investor would consider setting up a wholly-owned project in country k if U(wo) >
0, or q < Vwo  / (c + 0).  Likewise, she would consider  engaging in a joint venture if U(v)>0,
or q < (VJv  -yt)  I (c + ft).
The foreign investor would choose a wholly-owned  project over a joint venture if and
only if U(wo) > U(jv)  or
VwO  - (c + f)q  > VJV  -,X - tq - cq
Rearranging the terms, we obtain
t>  (VJv  - VWO)  + 6c
The solution is best represented in Figure 1, where the investment decision is mapped
out in a two-dimensional  space along the level of corruption in the host country and the level
of technological sophistication  of the investing firm. When corruption level q is sufficiently
high, no foreign investment in any ownership form would take place. Conditional on foreign
investment taking place, the foreign investor would prefer a wholly-owned form if its
technology is sufficiently sophisticated.  On the other hand, holding the level of technological
sophistication  constant, the higher the corruption (up to a limit), the more inclined the foreign
investor is to set up a joint venture.
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Figure 1: FDI Decision as a function of local corruption and firm's technology
5HI. Empirical Evidence
In this section, we report the statistical evidence on the connection between corruption
and ownership structure of foreign  direct investment. We describe the empirical work in three
steps: (1) the economic specification,  (2) some key variables (their measures and sources,
with more details in a separate appendix), and (3) the regression results and their
interpretations.
Econometric Specification
While using the simple theoretical  model in the previous section to motivate our
econometric specification, we also bring in additional control variables that the literature on
foreign investment suggests are important. More specifically, we estimate a systern consisting
of two parts. The first part describes  the investor's decision to enter a particular host country,
k. The second part describes the decision on the choice between  wholly-owned form or joint
venture, conditional on FDI taking place.
Let FDIjk  be a dummy variable that takes the value of one if firmj chooses to invest in
host country k, and zero otherwise.  We assume that this investment  takes place if and only if a
latent variable, FDI*jk  is positive. The latent variable depends on a vector of factors including
the level of corruption in host country k  denoted by qk. In other words,
FDIjk = lif FDI;k > 0
FDI,k =0  otherwise
where
FDI;k =  XJkI6+mqk  +6  j
Xjk  vector of determinants of FDI* other than corruption, and ,8 (vector) and rare
parameters. In subsequent discussion and in the regression tables, we label the last equation
on FDI* as the "FDI decision equation."
Let OWNERSHIPjk  be a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the foreign
investment  by finnj  takes the wholly-owned form in host country k (conditional on the
investment taking place), and zero if the investment  is ajoint venture. Wholly-owned form
occurs if and only if another latent variable, OWNERSHIP*j,  is positive. In other words,
6OWNERSHIPjk  = 1  if OWNERSHIPJk  >0 and FDI  *k  >0
OWNERSHIPjk  = 0  if OWNERSHIP;k  < 0 and FDI  *jk  >  0
where
OWNERSHIP,k  =  WjkO + SLqk +'5 2 t 1 + vV
tj is an index of technological sophistication  for firmj,  Wis a vector of determinants of the
ownership structure other than host country's corruption and foreign investor's technological
sophistication, 9(vector), o5  and 62 are parameters to be estimated. In subsequent discussion
and in the regression tables, we label the last equation on OWNERSHIP*  as the "ownership
decision equation."
Assuming that (e  v) are i.i.d normal variables with zero means and a correlation
coefficient of p, we estimate these equations (probit with sample selection) simultaneously  by
maximum likelihood. The number of observations  in the FDI decision equation is equal to the
number of firms in the sample,  multiplied by the number of destination countries in the
sample. In the ownership decision equation, the number of observations  is equal to the total
number of (actual or planned) FDI projects in the sample.
In terms of the parameterization  described above, the central hypotheses that we seek
to test are the following:
(a) Corruption discourages foreign direct investment, i.e., y< 0, in the FDI decision
equation;
(b) Conditional  on FDI taking place and holding constant the technological level of the
foreign investor, corruption encourages the joint venture form (or discourages  the sole
ownership), i.e., 62  < 0, in the ownership decision equation;
And (c) conditional on FDI taking place, a more technologically  advanced firm is
more likely to adopt a wholly-owned form, i.e., 62 > 0 in the ownership decision equation.
Data
Our empirical work employs a unique firm-level data set based on a survey conducted
by the European Bank for Reconstruction  and Development. In January 1995, a brief
questionnaire  was sent out to all companies (about 9,500) listed in the Worldscope database. 6
6 Worldscope  is  a commercial  database  that  provides  detailed  fmancial  statements,  business  descriptions,  and
historical  pricing  infonnation  on  thousands  of public  companies  located  in more  than  fifty  countries.
7Responses were obtained from 1,405 firms that answered questions regarding their existing or
planned FDI in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet  Union. 7 381 respondents had actually
invested and further 70 firms planned to invest in the region.
The survey inquired about the form of the project: ajoint venture with a local partner,
acquisition or greenfield.  For the purposes of this study, we treat all projects not associated
with JVs as wholly owned. The questionnaire  did not ask for the exact ownership shares
between foreign and local partners for joint ventures,  nor the timing nor the size of the
investment, which are unfortunate for us. Since  inflows of FDI were negligible prior to 1989,
the investments covered in our sample  took place (or were planed to take place) between 1989
and 1995.8  Table 1 presents the distribution of investment  projects across host countries.
A key regressor is host country's corruption level. Corruption,  by its very nature, is
difficult to get a precise measure. There are a few measures available "on the market," all of
which are subjective perceptions 9. There are three types of such indexes. The first is based on
surveys of individual "experts" (typically every country is rated by one expert). Popular
examples of this type include the Business International (BI) Index used in Mauro (1995),
Wei (1997 and 2000) and others, and International Country Risk Group (ICRG) index used
by, for example,  Ades and Di Tella (1999) and Wei (2000). The second type is based on
surveys of firms. Typically multiple firms per country are surveyed, and the average answer
for each country is used as the value of corruption index for that country. Relative to the first
type, this type of indexes reduces the impact of the idiosyncratic  errors of individual
respondents. Most popular indexes of this type include the Global Competitiveness  Report
(GCR) index by the World Economic Forum and the World Development Report (WDR)
index by the World Bank.  Both GCR and WDR indexes were used in Kaufinann and Wei
(1999). The third type is to pool together information from several existing indexes  by
averaging or other statistical extraction  methods. The most widely known index of this type
is the one compiled  by the Transparency International (TI), an international  non-governmental
7117 of the survey  respondents  were  chosen  for in-depth  interviews  whose  results  are discussed  in Lankes  and
Venables  (1996).
8 "Several  CEECs  had already  allowed  minority  foreign  participation  in  joint  ventures  in  the 1970s  and 1980s,
but this  opportunity  was not  attractive  enough  to foreign  investors.  Except  for  a few  showpieces,  foreign
investment  started  to flow  only  after  the transformation  to market  economy  had been  launched"  (Hunya,  1997,  p.
286).
9 See Wei (1999) for a discussion  of the various corruption indexes.
8organization dedicated to fighting corruption. 10 Unfortunately, many of these indexes such as
the BI, GCR and ICRG indexes, do not cover enough transition economies to be useful for
our examination.
In this paper, we use two corruption indexes that have adequate coverage of the
transition economies. The first one is the WDR index, which is based on a survey undertaken
in 1996 by the World Bank in preparation  of the World  Development Report 1997. The
survey covered 3,866 firms in 73 countries.  The rating is based on the response to Question
14 which asked: "Is it common for firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular,
'additional' payments to get things done?" The respondents were asked to rate corruption on a
1 to 6 scale with 1 denoting "always" and 6 "never." To facilitate interpretation of the results
we re-scaled the variable in the following  way: re-scaled WDR index = 7 - original WDR
index. Thus, higher values correspond  to a higher level of corruption.
The second measure is the 1999  Transparency International Corruption Perception
Index (TI index for short) which pools information  from ten different surveys of business
executives,  risk analysts and the general public. The original index ranges between 10 (highly
clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). Again we re-scale the index so that a higher value corresponds
to a higher level of corruption."
There is a regrettable mismatch in timing between our corruption measures (1996 and
1999, respectively) and the FDI data (1995). Unfortunately, as far as we know, all corruption
indexes prior to 1995 do not cover most of the transition economies in our sample. We note
however that the relative rankings of corruption levels across countries are unlikely to change
very much in a five year span. For example, the International Country Risk Group (ICRG)
corruption index covers eight countries in our sample. The Speannan rank correlation
coefficients for these countries are 0.98 between the 1994 and 1996 values, and 0.94 between
the 1994 and 1998 values, respectively. Hence, as far as these countries are concerned, the
relative rankings are fairly stable in the 1990s.  Nonetheless,  the mismatch is a shortcoming
that we need to keep in mind.
Note also that our estimation  would produce a negative sign on the corruption variable
if corruption per se was not affecting the choice of entry mode but its level was positively
'  Kaufmnann,  Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton  (1999) constructed their own index by pooling infonnation from
existing indexes using an unobserved component method.
9correlated with the restrictions on the extent of foreign ownership. To the best of our
knowledge,  however, in none of the countries in the sample there exists legislation
specifically forbidding full ownership by foreign investors. For instance, in the USSR a
presidential decree issued as early as October 1990 allowed foreign  wholly owned companies
to be established in the form of branches or subsidiaries.  The decree also created the legal
basis for foreign investors to buy out existing Soviet enterprises  as these were privatized
(McMillan 1996,  p. 50). In Hungary, Act XXIV of 1988 on the Investment of Foreigners in
Hungary allowed non-Hungarian  companies to own equity up to 100% (WTO, 1998). In
Poland, the 1988 Law on Economic  Activity with the Participation  of Foreign Parties
permitted 100 per cent foreign equity participation (GATT, 1992).
In many transition economies,  however, FDI in sectors such as production of military
equipment and extraction of natural resources has been subject to restrictions on the extent of
foreign  ownership. 12 Therefore, we exclude firms in the coal, gas and oil industry from our
sample. Since service sectors tend to be more restricted than manufacturing, we focus on
firms in manufacturing  sectors only.
Another crucial variable in our regressions is a measure of investor's technological
sophistication. We use the ratio of firm R&D intensity to the industry average, as suggested
by Smarzynska  (2000).13  We also include industry level R&D intensity. In addition to
technology leakage, foreign investors may be concerned about dissipation of other intangible
assets, for instance, marketing techniques. Thus, we also control for industry advertising
intensity and investor's sophistication  in marketing techniques. The latter is proxied by
investor's advertising intensity relative to the industry mean.'4 All of these variables, with the
exception  of industry advertising intensity, were found by Smarzynska  to be positively related
to the probability of full ownership.
Additionally, we control for firm size, production diversification and the distance
between home and host countries. Blomstrdm and Zejan (1991) suggested that larger firms
11  While  an index  corresponding  to an earlier  year  would  have  been  more  appropriate,  it covered  a smaller
number  of countries  in  our data  set.
12 See  Dunning  and  Rojec  (1993)  for a description.
13R&D  intensity  is defined  as the ratio  of R&D  expenditure  to net sales.  The  figures  for R&D  intensity  and other
firm  specific  variables  come  from  the Worldscope  database.  See  Appendix  I for more  details.
14 There  is also  another  reason  why  firms  investing  heavily  in advertising  may  want  to seek  full ownership.  A 1V
partner  may  have  a strong  incentive  to free  ride on  the reputation  of a foreign  partner  by debasing  the quality  of
10are more likely to take higher risks and thus more often choose full ownership. Their
empirical results, however, led to the opposite conclusion. Stopford and Wells (1972) pointed
out that more diversified firms may be more tolerant towards minority ownership and thus
more likely to engage in JVs. Meyer (1998) has confirmed this prediction. Finally, we include
a measure of the distance between investor's home country and the investment destination as
a proxy for cultural distance. As Kogut and Singh (1988) have shown, cultural distance is
positively related to the probability of a JV which suggests that a local partner is more useful
in less familiar environment.
The investment  equation includes several other regressors such as a host country's
GDP, GDP per capita, distance between investor's country and the host as well as a measure
of unit labor costs and tax rates in the host country. We expect to find that the probability of
investment is positively related to the market size (GDP) and purchasing  power of local
consumers (GDP per capita) and negatively correlated with distance, labor costs and tax rates.
Additionally,  we control for production diversification since less diversified firms are more
likely to be forced by competitive  pressures in their home countries to search for new
markets.15
All variables are described in more detail in Appendix I. Summary statistics are listed in
Table 1A in Appendix II.
Statistical  Results
Table 2 presents the estimation  results using the WDR index as our measure of
corruption. Column 1 reports the basic regression. The top panel describes the FDI decision
equation. We find that foreign investors that are large and have a less diversified production
structure are more likely to invest in the transition economies. They are attracted to countries
with large markets and higher GDP per capita. Distance between investor's country and the
host has a negative impact on the probability of FDI. More essential for the current paper, we
find that more corruption in a host country is associated  with a lower probability of
investment. The two interactive terms between host country corruption and foreign investor's
the product carrying the foreign trademnark.  In such a case, the local partner appropriates  the full benefits of
debasement while bearing only a small fraction of the costs (Caves, 1982).
'5  See Markusen (1995) for a survey of FDI determinants.
11technological level are insignificant. The two interactive  terms between host country
corruption and the firm's marketing intensity are positive and significant.
In the lower panel of Columnl, where the result on the ownership decision is reported,
we find that the coefficient on corruption is negative and statistically  significant, indicating
that corruption encourages  foreign investor to form a joint venture with a local partner, which
is consistent with our hypothesis. The coefficients on measures of the foreign investor's level
of technological  (and marketing) sophistication  are positive and (mostly) significant,
indicating that firms with better technology are more reluctant to use local partners, which is
also consistent with our hypothesis.
It may be interesting  to see the magnitude of the effect of corruption on the ownership
composition as estimated in Column 1. As corruption  decreases from the level of Azerbaijan
(WDR corruption index = 4.6 on a 1-7 scale) to that of Hungary (WDR corruption index =
2.6), the probability that a foreign investor will enter through a wholly-owned subsidiary goes
up by fourteen percentage points (say from 30% to 44%).
In Columns 2 and 3, we progressively  add host country's marginal corporate tax and
unit labor cost to the FDI decision equation. We find that the tax rate is not significant in our
sample, but low labor cost does help to attract FDI. As far as our key hypotheses are
concerned, corruption continues to have a negative effect on FDI entry and on the likelihood
of sole ownership, and high technological sophistication  of the foreign investors still make
them shy away from joint ventures. These are the same as the estimates  in Column 116.
ln Columns 4-6, we repeat the first three regressions except that we also add the
distance (in log) between the host and source countries in the ownership decision equations.
This is to examine the possibility that informational barriers that are correlated with the
distance may encourage foreign investors to use a local partner. While the negative signs on
the coefficients are consistent with this view, they are not statistically  different from zero.
Again, host country corruption continues to discourage inward FDI, and conditional on FDI
taking place, continues to discourage sole ownership.
In the FDI decision equations (top panel of Table 2), the interaction terms between
corruption and technological sophistication  do not appear to be statistically significant.
16  In Column  3, while  the coefficient  on corruption  is still  negative  in the ownership  decision  equation,  but the
significance level drops to 15%. This is due to an increase in the standard error of the estimator rather than a
decrease in the absolute value of the point estimate.
12Interactions  with marketing sophistication  proxies bear positive and significant coefficients.
This result suggests that marketing know-how does not affect investors' decisions in the same
way as technological  sophistication.
In regressions that are not reported here, we have also experimented  with including the
interactive  terms between firms' technological  sophistication  and host country corruption in
the ownership decision equations. If we do not include the measures of technological level by
themselves, the coefficients on the interactive  terms are positive and statistically significant.
Corruption  variable continues to have a negative and statistically  significant coefficient in the
ownership decision equation. This result can be consistent with the following  hypothesis:
foreign investors are generally  more inclined to form joint ventures in a corrupt country, but
their interest in joint ventures decreases  with their level of technological  sophistication
because of the concern that intellectual property rights protection becomes more problematic
in a more corrupt country.
On the other hand, if both the interactive  terms and the technology variables by
themselves are included in the ownership decision equations,  both sets of coefficients become
statistically insignificant. This could be due to a multicollinearity  problem. In any case, we
are not able to say anything definitive about the interactive  term between corruption and
technological  sophistication.
In Table 3, we repeat the regressions in Table 2 by using the Transparency International
index as an alternative  measure of host country corruption. The results are essentially the
same. In particular, we find that corruption discourages  foreign investment in the first place.
Once foreign investment  takes place, corruption discourages  wholly-owned foreign firms.
As mentioned at the beginning of the paper, Hines (1995) suggests  that US
multinationals are more likely to avoid  joint ventures in corrupt countries than investors of
other nationalities. To test this hypothesis, we include in both equations of our model a
dummy variable for US investors and an interaction between the dummy and corruption level.
The results are presented in Table 4. We find no evidence  that American firms invest less in
corrupt countries, which is consistent with the results of Wei (2000). We show, however, that
US companies are indeed more averse  to joint ventures in more corrupt host countries (or
more likely to set up wholly-owned firms). The last finding may be due to the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.
13IV. Conclusions
This paper studies how a foreign investor's choice of the entry mode is affected by both
the investor's technological  sophistication  and the extent of corruption in a host country.
Corruption  makes local bureaucracy  less transparent and hence increases the value of a local
joint venture partner to a foreign investor. On the other hand, foreign investors with
sophisticated  technology may worry about leakage of technological  know-how by joint
venture partners and are thus less inclined to form a joint venture.
We test these hypotheses using a firm-level data se on FDI in Eastern Europe and the
Former Soviet Union in the early 1990s. The data are broadly consistent with our hypotheses.
In addition, we find that, other things equal, American investors are somewhat  more reluctant
to form joint ventures in more corrupt countries, possibly because of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977.
For joint venture firms, our data set does not have information on the exact ownership
shares between foreign and local partners. It may be useful to work out the effect of
corruption on majority- versus minority-owned  joint ventures and test it with some more
refined data in the future.
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16Appendix I
Firm specific variables used in the empirical analysis come from Worldscope  which  is a
commercial  database providing detailed financial statements,  business descriptions, and
historical pricing information  on thousands of public companies located in more than fifty
countries. They pertain to 1993 or the closest year for which the information was available
and refer to worldwide operations of each firm. Below we present a more detailed description
of the variables.
>  Industry R&D intensity: measured  by R&D expenditure  as a percentage of net sales. To
find the industry averages  we used figures for all firms listed in Worldscope  in a given
industry. The industry averages  have been calculated  at the three digit SIC industry
classification' 7
>  Relative R&D intensity:  measured by the ratio of a firm's R&D intensity to the industry
average  8
>  Industry advertising intensity: measured  by Sales, General and Administrative
expenditure  divided by net sales. This variable is a standard proxy for advertising
intensity used in the literature
>  Relative advertising intensity:  measured by the ratio of a firm's advertising intensity to
the industry average
>  Firm size: measured by a firm's sales in millions of US dollars
>  Diversification:  measured by the number of four digit SIC codes describing a fimn's
activities
>  GDP and GDPper capita: data for 1993. Source: EBRD (1994)
>  Corruption WDR: WDR rating is based on the response to question 14 which asked: "Is
it common for firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular, "additional"
payments to get things done?" The respondents were asked to rate corruption on a 1 to 6
1  When  calculating  industry  averages,  we have  removed  two  outliers  from  the drug  sector  and one  from
communications  equipment  industry.  These  firms  reported  R&D  intensities  equal  to 16598,  1815  and  2560,
respectively.  All three  fmns reported  sales  below  $500,000  thus  they  are likely  to be start  up companies.  Note
that  the conclusions  of the paper  are remain  unchanged  even  if this  correction  is not performed.
8If finm  and  industry  level  figures  were  both  equal  to zero,  relative  R&D  intensity  took  on the value  of one.
17scale with 1 denoting "always" and 6 "never." To facilitate interpretation  of the results
we rescaled the variable in the following  way: rescaled WDR = 7 - original WDR.
Thus, higher values correspond to a higher level of corruption
>  Corruption TI: Transparency  International Corruption  Perceptions Index relates to
perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the
general public. It ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). Again we
rescaled the index so that higher values correspond to a higher level of corruption.
Rescaled TI index = 11 - original TI index
>  Distance: logarithm of distance in kilometers  between the capital cities. The primary
source is Rudloff (1981), supplemented  by Pearce and Smith (1984). In the case of
following  countries the average distance from the main cities was used: Argentina
(Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Rosario), Australia (Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne), Canada
(Toronto,  Vancouver, Montreal), Russia (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nizbni Novogorod).
The data for Nizhni Novogorod is from http://www.unn.runnet.ruinn/whereis.htm.  For the
United States Kansas City, Missouri was used, for Netherlands De Bilt, Slovakia Poprad,
Switzerland  Zurich. Distances between Taiwan and other countries are from Shang-jin
Wei's NBER web site: www.nber.org/-wei.
>  Unit labor costs: relative to the Austrian level. Source: Havlik (1996)
>  Corporate tax rate: in percentages;  if several rates apply, the highest one was used.
Source:  PriceWaterhousePaineWebber.
Distance, GDP, GDP per capita and firm size are used in the log form.
18Table 1. Distribution  of Projects by Host Country
Host country  No of JV projects  in  No.  of wholly  owned  Total no.  of projects  in
Host____country____  the sample  projects in the sample  the sample
Albania  3  1  4
Azerbaijan  1  1  2
Belarus  5  3  8
Bulgaria  16  13  29
Croatia  7  4  11
Czech  55  53  108
Estonia  16  8  24
FYR Macedonia  2  1  3
Georgia  4  2  6
Hungary  50  48  98
Kazakhstan  10  6  16
Latvia  13  6  19
Lithuania  8  5  13
Moldova  2  0  2
Poland  84  51  135
Romania  21  12  33
Russia  83  31  114
Slovakia  26  19  45
Slovenia  13  5  18
Turkmenistan  1  0  1
Ukraine  20  5  25
Uzbekistan  5  1  6
TOTAL  1  445  275  720
Source countries (listed in the decreasing order of importance in the sample): Germany,  United
Kingdom, France, United States, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland,  Netherlands, Demnark, Norway,
Belgium, Australia, Japan, Austria, Portugal, Canada, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Brazil, Spain,
Singapore,  Malaysia, South Africa and South Korea.
19Table 2. Corruption and Ownership Structure of FDI: WDR Corruption  Index
FDI DECISION EQUATION  |
Constant  4.0457**  -4.1270**  -5.2929**  -4.0330**  -4.1160**  -5.1227**
(0.5673)  (0.5720)  (0.8722)  (0.5693)  (0.5737)  (0.8698)
Firm size  0.2281**  0.2282**  0.2397**  0.2281**  0.2283**  0.2397**
(0.0201)  (0.0202)  (0.0226)  (0.0202)  (0.0203)  (0.0226)
Production Diversification  -0.0306*  -0.0301*  -0.0189  -0.0306*  -0.0302k  -0.0190
(0.0183)  (0.0184)  (0.0212)  (0.0183)  (0.0184)  (0.0212)
Total GDP  0.3661**  0.3604**  0.3530**  0.3663**  0.3606**  0.3492**
(0.0267)  (0.0269)  (0.0426)  (0.0267)  (0.0268)  (0.0426)
GDP per capita  0.0574  0.0573  0.1732**  0.0561  0.0562  0.1694**
(0.0540)  (0.0544)  (0.0830)  (0.0541)  (0.0545)  (0.0828)
WDR Corruption Index  -0.3295**  -0.3515**  -0.3899**  -0.3302**  -0.3519**  -0.3990**
(0.0736)  (0.0768)  (0.1011)  (0.0736)  (0.0768)  (0.0997)
Firm Tech Sophistication  0.0063  0.0063  0.0065  0.0063  0.0063  0.0066
* WDR Corruption  Index  (0.0090)  (0.0090)  (0.0103)  (0.0091)  (0.0091)  (0.0104)
Industry Tech Sophistication  -0.0027  -0.0026  -0.0028  -0.0027  -0.0026  -0.0028
* WDR Corruption  Index  (0.0033)  (0.0034)  (0.0042)  (0.0034)  (0.0034)  (0.0042)
Firm Marketing Sophist.  0.0555**  0.0557**  0.0758**  0.0555**  0.0557**  0.0755**
* WDR Corruption Index  (0.0195)  (0.0196)  (0.0210)  (0.0197)  (0.0197)  (0.0211)
Industry Marketing Sophist  0.0044**  0.0044**  0.0046**  0.0044**  0.0044**  0.0045**
* WDR Corruption Index  (0.0008)  (0.0008)  (0.0009)  (0.0008)  (0.0008)  (0.0009)
Distance  -0.4888**  -OA850**  -0.3988**  -OA892**  -0.4854**  -0.4015**
(0.0368)  (0.0369)  (0.0454)  (0.0372)  (0.0372)  (0.0454)
Tax rate  0.0060  0.0004  0.0059  -0.0005
(0.0056)  (0.0067)  (0.0056)  (0.0067)
Unit labor cost  -0.0115*  -0.0123*
(0.0066)  (0.0066)
OWNERSHIP  DECISION EQUATION
Constant  -2.8361**  -2.8050**  -3.3824**  -2.7816**  -2.7600**  -3.1644**
(0.9607)  (0.9642)  (1.2055)  (0.9892)  (0.9926)  (1.1121)
Firm size  0.1428**  0.1416**  0.1780**  0.1483**  0.1463**  0.2152**
(0.0496)  (0.0498)  (0.0552)  (0.0521)  (0.0524)  (0.0530)
Production Diversification  -0.1063**  -0.1068**  -0.0929**  -0.1078**  -0.1080**  -0.0974**
(0.0419)  (0.0419)  (0.0443)  (0.0423)  (0.0424)  (0.0437)
Firm Tech Sophistication  0.1986**  0.1980**  0.1647**  0.1970**  0.1967**  0.1594**
(0.0662)  (0.0663)  (0.0767)  (0.0673)  (0.0673)  (0.0754)
Industry Tech Sophistication  0.1290**  0.1289**  0.1018**  0.1283**  0.1283**  0.0939**
(0.0302)  (0.0302)  (0.0320)  (0.0302)  (0.0302)  (0.0317)
Firm Marketing Sophist.  0.7116**  0.7103**  0.7305**  0.7136**  0.7122**  0.7312**
(0.1667)  (0.1669)  (0.1811)  (0.1656)  (0.1660)  (0.1668)
Industry Marketing Sophist.  0.0052  0.0051  0.0102  0.0053  0.0052  0.0115*
(0.0070)  (0.0070)  (0.0076)  (0.0070)  (0.0070)  (0.0072)
WDR Corruption Index  -0.2306*  -0.2278*  -0.2463#  -0.2242*  -0.2224*  -0.2238#
(0.1308)  (0.1314)  (0.1524)  (0.1347)  (0.1353)  (0.1482)
Distance  -0.0252  -0.0213  -0.1468
(0.0962)  (0.0964)  (0.1250)
Rho (1,2)  0.1151  0.1041  0.1451  0.1424  0.1275  0.3897
(0.1656)  (0.1665)  (0.2414)  (0.1876)  (0.1889)  (0.2784)
No Obs Eql  6004  6004  2212  6004  6004  2212
No Obs Eq2  339  339  282  339  339  282
Log L  -1074.10  -1073.505  -827.9399  -1074.062  -1073.477  -827.2233
**,  *,  F denote significant at 5%, 10% and 15% level, respectively. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
GDP, GDP per capita, distance and firm size are in logarithms.
20Table 3. Using TI Corruption Index
FDI DECISION  EQUATION
Constant  -2.4312**  -2.4314**  -3.0539**  -2A355**  -2A353**  -3.0380**
(0.7120)  (0.7128)  (1.0812)  (0.7136)  (0.7146)  (1.0780)
Firm size  0.2205**  0.2205**  0.2319**  0.2205**  0.2205**  0.2318**
(0.0188)  (0.0189)  (0.0212)  (0.0189)  (0.0189)  (0.0212)
Production Diversification  -0.0387**  -0.0388**  -0.0338*  -0.0387**  -0.0388**  -0.0338*
(0.0172)  (0.0172)  (0.0197)  (0.0173)  (0.0173)  (0.0198)
Total GDP  0.4493**  0.4489**  0.4842**  OA494**  0.4489**  0.4836**
(0.0305)  (0.0308)  (0.0428)  (0.0306)  (0.0308)  (0.0429)
GDP per capita  -0.1856**  -0.1812**  0.0361  -0.1854**  -0.1810**  0.0363
(0.0721)  (0.0742)  (0.0938)  (0.0724)  (0.0745)  (0.0939)
TI Corruption Index  -0.2479**  -0.2406**  -OA332**  -0.2478**  -0.2406**  -0.4332**
(0.0522)  (0.0553)  (0.0786)  (0.0523)  (0.0553)  (0.0787)
Firm Tech Sophistication  0.0034  0.0034  0.0040  0.0034  0.0034  0.0040
* TI Corruption  Index  (0.0041)  (0.0041)  (0.0046)  (0.0041)  (0.0041)  (0.0046)
Industry Tech Sophistication  -0.0011  -0.0011  -0.0007  -0.0011  -0.0011  -0.0007
* TI Corruption  Index  (0.0015)  (0.0015)  (0.0018)  (0.0016)  (0.0016)  (0.0019)
Firm Marketing Sophist.  0.0236**  0.0236**  0.0312**  0.0236**  0.0236**  0.0312**
* TI Corruption  Index  (0.0088)  (0.0088)  (0.0095)  (0.0088)  (0.0088)  (0.0096)
Industry Marketing Sophist.  0.0020**  0.0020**  0.0021**  0.0020**  0.0020**  0.0021**
* TI Corruption  Index  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0004)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0004)
Distance  -0.4783**  -0.4794**  -0.4023**  -0.4782**  -0.4792**  -0.4025**
(0.0342)  (0.0342)  (0.0414)  (0.0347)  (0.0347)  (0.0417)
Tax rate  -0.0023  -0.0045  -0.0023  -0.0047
(0.0055)  (0.0063)  (0.0055)  (0.0063)
Unit labor cost  -0.0311**  -0.0312**
(0.0060)  (0.0061)
OWiNERSHIP  DECISION EQUATION
Constant  -2.3198**  -2.3351**  -2A562*  -2.3368**  -2.3501**  -2A278*
(0.9995)  (0.9993)  (1.2743)  (1.0125)  (1.0115)  (1.2519)
Firm size  0.1302**  0.1306**  0.1506**  0.1261**  0.1270**  0.1622**
(0.0477)  (0.0476)  (0.0535)  (0.0521)  (0.0521)  (0.0620)
Production Diversification  -0.0935**  -0.0933**  -0.0839**  -0.0922**  -0.0922**  -0.0873**
(0.0409)  (0.0409)  (0.0423)  (0.0419)  (0.0419)  (0.0436)
Firm Tech Sophistication  0.2120**  0.2122**  0.1796**  0.2130**  0.2132**  0.1788**
(0.0644)  (0.0645)  (0.0735)  (0.0650)  (0.0651)  (0.0735)
Industry Tech Sophistication  0.1238**  0.1239**  0.0996**  0.1243**  0.1243**  0.0982**
(0.0297)  (0.0297)  (0.0315)  (0.0297)  (0.0296)  (0.0315)
Firm Marketing Sophist.  0.7693**  0.7698**  0.7691**  0.7673**  0.7681**  0.7765**
(0.1624)  (0.1624)  (0.1784)  (0.1633)  (0.1632)  (0.1765)
Industry Marketing Sophist.  0.0078  0.0079  0.0117P  0.0077  0.0078  0.0120*
(0.0068)  (0.0068)  (0.0072)  (0.0068)  (0.0068)  (0.0072)
TI Corruption Index  -0.1726**  -0.1728**  -0.1843**  -0.1772**  -0.1769**  -0.1737**
(0.0659)  (0.0659)  (0.0743)  (0.0723)  (0.0726)  (0.0851)
Distance  0.0177  0.0158  -0.0462
(0.0984)  (0.0990)  (0.1360)
Rho (1,2)  0.0813  0.0858  0.0274  0.0621  0.0686  0.0883
(0.1522)  (0.1520)  (0.1986)  (0.1819)  (0.1823)  (0.2680)
No Obs Eql  6636  6636  3160  6636  6636  3160
No Obs Eq2  361  361  306  361  361  306
Log L  -1193.945  -1193.859  -941.809  -1193.926  -1193.844  -941.7314
**, *, ' denote significant at 5%, 10% and 15%  level, respectively.  Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
GDP, GDP per capita, distance and firm size are in logarithms.
21Table 4. Are US Investors Special?
FDI  DECISION  EQUATION
WDR  WDR  WDR  TI  |  T  TI
Constant  -2.5416**  -2.5925**  -3.1373**  -1.0293  -1.0150  -1.1330
(0.6213)  (0.6295)  (0.9754)  (0.7548)  (0.7540)  (1.1652)
Firm size  0.2197**  0.2199**  0.2332**  0.2117**  0.2115**  0.2247**
(0.0204)  (0.0205)  (0.0228)  (0.0191)  (0.0191)  (0.0213)
Production Diversification  -0.0082  -0.0081  -0.0039  -0.0i93  -0.0193  -0.0215
(0.0190)  (0.0191)  (0.0220)  (0.0179)  (0.0179)  (0.0205)
Total GDP  0.3819**  03790**  0.3724**  0.4598**  0.4590**  0.4973**
(0.0277)  (0.0278)  (0.0445)  (0.0319)  (0.0321)  (0.0446)
GDP per capita  0.0289  0.0291  0.135e  -0.1978**  -0.1878**  0.0074
(0.0558)  (0.0560)  (0.0847)  (0.0746)  (0.0763)  (0.0964)
Corruption  -03138**  -03249**  -0.4141**  40.2099**  -0.1924**  -0.4014**
(0.0814)  (0.0855)  (0.1174)  (0.0540)  (0.0579)  (0.0841)
Firm Tech Sophistication  0.0048  0.0048  0.0054  0.0027  0.0026  0.0035
* Corruption  (0.0097)  (0.0097)  (0.0113)  (0.0044)  (0.0044)  (0.0050)
Industry  Tech Sophist.  -0.0017  -0.0017  -0.0024  -0.0008  -0.0008  -0.0007
* Corruption  (0.0035)  (0.0035)  (0.0044)  (0.0016)  (0.0016)  (0.0019)
Firm Marketing Sophist.  0.0610**  0.0610**  0.0795**  0.0257**  0.0257**  0.0324**
* Corruption  (0.0200)  (0.0200)  (0.0216)  (0.0090)  (0.0090)  (0.0097)
Industry  Marketing Sophist.  Q.004**  0.0046**  0.0047**  0.0021**  0.0021**  0.0022**
* Corruption  (0.0008)  (0.0008)  (0Q0009)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)
Distance  -0.7073**  -0.7033**  -0.6637**  -0.7190**  -0.7246**  -0.6795**
(0.0530)  (0.0535)  (0.0739)  (0.0509)  (0.0514)  (0.0692)
Tax rate  0.0028  -0.0036  -0.0053  -0.0079
(0.0058)  (0.0071)  (0.0056)  (0.0066)
Unit labor cost  .0115*  -0.0300**
(0.0067)  (0.0061)
US parent  0.4779  0.4643  0.1122  1.0451*  1.0700*  0.8617
(0.4725)  (0.4759)  (0.5406)  (0.5674)  (0.5721)  (0.6125)
US parent * Corruption  0.0837  0.0857  0.2020  -0.0332  -0.0354  -0.0068
(0.1312)  (0.1317)  (0.1515)  (0.0752)  (0.0756)  (0.0808)
OWNERSHIP  DECISION  EQUATION
Constant  -1.6977  -1.693*  -1.2662  -1.3291  -1.3511  -0.8541
(1.1177)  (1.1182)  (1.4915)  (1.1211)  (1.1202)  (1.5168)
Firm size  0.1400**  0.1391**  0.2099**  0.1231**  0.1251**  0.1674**
(0.0534)  (0.0535)  (0.0553)  (0.0527)  (0.0525)  (0.0609)
Production Diversification  -0.0975**  -0.0977**  -0.0935**  -0.0843**  -0.0841**  -0.0851*
(0.0436)  (0Q0436)  (0.0449)  (0.0427)  (0.0427)  (0.0437)
Finn Tech Sophistication  0.2094**  0.2092**  0.1698**  0.2251**  0.2255**  0.1900**
(0.0687)  (0.0687)  (0.0790)  (0.0667)  (0.0669)  (0.0756)
Industry Tech Sophist.  0.1341**  0.1341**  0.0988**  0.1283**  0.1284**  0.0989**
(0.0314)  (0.0314)  (0.0335)  (0.0308)  (0.0308)  (0.0329)
Firm Marketing Sophist.  0.7479**  0.7472**  0.7670**  0.7840**  0.7858**  0.7991**
(0.1731)  (0.1732)  (0.1745  (0.1679)  (0.1676)  (0.1788)
Industry Marketing Sophist.  0.0060  0.0059  0.0120  0.0083  0.0084  0.0128*
(0.0071)  (0.0071)  (0.0074)  (0.0069)  (0.0069)  (0.0072)
Corruption  -0.2839*  -0.2833*  -0.3321*  -0.2136**  -0.2127**  -0.2212**
(0.1582)  (0.1584)  (0.1811)  (0.0850)  (0.0852)  (0.0998)
Distance  -0.1474  -0.1453  -03629*  -0.0952  -0.1008  -0.2463
(0.1395)  (0.1400)  (0.2157)  (0.1469)  (0.1473)  (0.2354)
US parent  -1.4039  -1.4067  -1.2213  -1.6130  -1.6074  -1.5182
(1.2236)  (1.2243)  (1.3600  (1.495  1  (1.494  T  (I  i6414)
US parent  * Corruption  0Q5781*  Q784*  0.569C  0.2872  72  0.2877
(03391)  (0.3392)  (03683)  (0.1955)  (0.1956)  (0.2099)
Rho (1,2)  0.0658  0.0592  0.3258  0.0198  0.0342  0.0924
(0.2053)  (0.2059)  (0.3060)  (0.1951)  (0.1950)  (0.2707)
No Obs  Eql  6004  6004  2212  6636  6636  3160
No Obs  Eq2  339  339  282  361  361  306
Log L  -1048.989  -1048.866  -807.5265  -1165.932  -1165.508  -920.4021
22Appendix Table 1A. Summary Statistics
Variable  No of obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.
GDP  21  19,651  38,812
GDP per capita  21  1,321  1,422
WDR Corruption  Index  18  3.7  0.7
TI Corruption  Index  20  7.6  1.2
Corporate tax rate  21  29.5  6.5
Unit labor cost  10  27.5  13.8
Distance  15,824  4,946  3,966
Firm size (all)  1,306  2,864,259  9,434,850
Firm size(investors)  399  4,179,212  11,900,000
Production diversification (all)  1,316  3.6  2.0
Production diversification  (investors)  402  4.3  2.1
Relative R&D intensity (all)  523  1.3  2.5
Relative R&D intensity (investors)  195  1.7  3.5
Industry R&D intensity (all)  1,045  2.1  3.0
Industry R&D intensity (investors)  355  2.3  3.1
Relative advertising intensity (all)  705  1.0  0.8
Relative advertising intensity (investors)  242  1.0  0.7
Industry advertising intensity (all)  1,086  21.9  14.8
Industry advertising intensity (investors)  364  22.8  16.4
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